Until I saw this. An Orange County mom has filed a police complaint after her daughter was left with a concussion from a sucker punch during a youth basketball game. The rapper also pledged to offer full refunds to everyone who attended the concert.
After two and a half years with the 49ers and zero games played, Jalen Hurd has been released. The 49ers announced today that they have released Hurd, who had been on injured reserve. A talented athlete who had [more]. Sajad 'Iranian Hulk' Gharibi's training is either misguided, innovative or impressive; we're just not sure which. The Duchess of Sussex told reporters that she is "always proud" of her husband. Bob Myers believes the Warriors will benefit from situations like the one between Draymond and Jordan Poole on the bench Wednesday.
And we just learned where it came from. Jennifer Garner shares a photo of herself from 20 years ago, looking almost exactly the same. Edmond hunter kills possible state record deer in Logan County. Steph had a great reaction as Anthony Edwards told him he was chasing a milestone in Wednesday night's Warriors-T-Wolves game. Here's what health officials think is happening. If, before or during questioning, the suspect seeks to invoke his right to remain silent, interrogation must be forgone or cease; a request for counsel.
Finally, there are a miscellany of minor directives, for example, the burden of proof of waiver is on the State, admissions and exculpatory statements are treated just like confessions, withdrawal of a waiver is always permitted, and so forth. While the fine points of this scheme are far less clear than the Court admits, the tenor is quite apparent.
The new rules are not designed to guard against police brutality or other unmistakably banned forms of coercion. Those who use third-degree tactics and deny them in court are equally able and destined to lie as skillfully about warnings and waivers. Rather, the thrust of the new rules is to negate all pressures, to reinforce the nervous or ignorant suspect, and ultimately to discourage any confession at all.
The aim, in short, is toward "voluntariness" in a utopian sense, or, to view it from a different angle, voluntariness with a vengeance. To incorporate this notion into the Constitution requires a strained reading of history and precedent and a disregard of the very pragmatic concerns that alone may on occasion justify such strains. I believe that reasoned examination will show that the Due Process Clauses provide an adequate tool for coping with confessions ,and that, even if the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination be invoked, its precedents, taken as a whole, do not sustain the present rules.
Viewed as a choice based on pure policy, these new rules prove to be a highly debatable, if not one-sided, appraisal of the competing interests, imposed over widespread objection, at the very time when judicial restraint is most called for by the circumstances. It is most fitting to begin an inquiry into the constitutional precedents by surveying the limits on confessions the Court has evolved under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is so because these cases show that there exists a workable and effective means of dealing with confessions in a judicial manner; because the cases are the baseline from which the Court now departs, and so serve to measure the actual, as opposed to the professed, distance it travels, and because examination of them helps reveal how the Court has coasted into its present position.
The earliest confession cases in this Court emerged from federal prosecutions, and were settled on a nonconstitutional basis, the Court adopting the common law rule that the absence of inducements, promises, and threats made a confession voluntary and admissible. Hopt v. While a later case said the Fifth Amendment privilege controlled admissibility, this proposition was not itself developed in subsequent decisions. This new line of decisions, testing admissibility by the Due Process Clause, began in with Brown v.
Mississippi , U. Oklahoma , U. To travel quickly over the main themes, there was an initial emphasis on reliability, e. Tennessee , U. Indiana , U. Colorado , U.
The outcome was a continuing reevaluation on the facts of each case of how much pressure on the suspect was permissible. Among the criteria often taken into account were threats or imminent danger, e.
Arkansas , U. Pate , U. Apart from direct physical coercion, however, no single default or fixed combination of defaults guaranteed exclusion, and synopses of the cases would serve little use, because the overall gauge has been steadily changing, usually in the direction of restricting admissibility. But to mark just what point had been reached before the Court jumped the rails in Escobedo v. There, Haynes had been held some 16 or more hours in violation of state law before signing the disputed confession, had received no warnings of any kind, and, despite requests, had been refused access to his wife or to counsel, the police indicating that access would be allowed after a confession.
Emphasizing especially this last inducement and rejecting some contrary indicia of voluntariness, the Court in a 5-to-4 decision, held the confession inadmissible. There are several relevant lessons to be drawn from this constitutional history.
The first is that, with over 25 years of precedent, the Court has developed an elaborate, sophisticated, and sensitive approach to admissibility of confessions. It is "judicial" in its treatment of one case at a time, see Culombe v. Connecticut , U. Of course, strict certainty is not obtained in this developing process, but this is often so with constitutional principles, and disagreement is usually confined to that borderland of close cases where it matters least.
The second point is that, in practice and, from time to time, in principle, the Court has given ample recognition to society's interest in suspect questioning as an instrument of law enforcement.
Cases countenancing quite significant pressures can be cited without difficulty, [ Footnote 5 ] and the lower courts may often have been yet more tolerant. Of course, the limitations imposed today were rejected by necessary implication in case after case, the right to warnings having been explicitly rebuffed in this Court many years ago.
Powers v. As recently as Haynes v. Finally, the cases disclose that the language in many of the opinions overstates the actual course of decision. It has been said, for example, that an admissible confession must be made by the suspect "in the unfettered exercise of his own will," Malloy v. Though often repeated, such principles are rarely observed in full measure.
Even the word "voluntary" may be deemed some. The tendency to overstate may be laid in part to the flagrant facts often before the Court; but, in any event, one must recognize how it has tempered attitudes and lent some color of authority to the approach now taken by the Court. I turn now to the Court's asserted reliance on the Fifth Amendment, an approach which I frankly regard as a tromp l'oeil. The Court's opinion, in my view, reveals no adequate basis for extending the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination to the police station.
Far more important, it fails to show that the Court's new rules are well supported, let alone compelled, by Fifth Amendment precedents. Instead, the new rules actually derive from quotation and analogy drawn from precedents under the Sixth Amendment, which should properly have no bearing on police interrogation.
The Court's opening contention, that the Fifth Amendment governs police station confessions, is perhaps not an impermissible extension of the law but it has little to commend itself in the present circumstances. Historically, the privilege against self-incrimination did not bear at all on the use of extra-legal confessions, for which distinct standards evolved; indeed,. Practice under the two doctrines has also differed in a number of important respects.
Even those who would readily enlarge the privilege must concede some linguistic difficulties, since the Fifth Amendment, in terms, proscribes only compelling any person "in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Though weighty, I do not say these points and similar ones are conclusive, for, as the Court reiterates, the privilege embodies basic principles always capable of expansion.
Accusatorial values, however, have openly been absorbed into the due process standard governing confessions; this, indeed, is why, at present, "the kinship of the two rules [governing confessions and self-incrimination] is too apparent for denial. Since extension of the general principle has already occurred, to insist that the privilege applies as such serves only to carry over inapposite historical details and engaging rhetoric and to obscure the policy choices to be made in regulating confessions.
Having decided that the Fifth Amendment privilege does apply in the police station, the Court reveals that the privilege imposes more exacting restrictions than does the Fourteenth Amendment's voluntariness test.
It then emerges from a discussion of Escobedo that the Fifth Amendment requires, for an admissible confession, that it be given by one distinctly aware of his right not to speak and shielded from "the compelling atmosphere" of interrogation.
See ante pp. From these key premises, the Court finally develops the safeguards of warning, counsel, and so forth. I do not believe these premises are sustained by precedents under the Fifth Amendment.
The more important premise is that pressure on the suspect must be eliminated, though it be only the subtle influence of the atmosphere and surroundings. The Fifth Amendment, however, has never been thought to forbid all pressure to incriminate one's self in the situations covered by it. On the contrary, it has been held that failure to incriminate one's self can result in denial of removal of one's case from state to federal court, Maryland v.
Soper , U. Willoughby , U. Hurwitz , F. This is not to say that, short of jail or torture, any sanction is permissible in any case; policy and history alike may impose sharp limits. Griffin v. However, the Court's unspoken assumption that any pressure violates the privilege is not supported by the precedents, and it has failed to show why the Fifth Amendment prohibits that relatively mild pressure the Due Process Clause permits.
The Court appears similarly wrong in thinking that precise knowledge of one's rights is a settled prerequisite under the Fifth Amendment to the loss of its protections. A number of lower federal court cases have held that grand jury witnesses need not always be warned of their privilege, e. Scully , F. Henry v. No Fifth Amendment precedent is cited for the Court's contrary view.
There might, of course, be reasons apart from Fifth Amendment precedent for requiring warning or any other safeguard on questioning, but that is a different matter entirely. See infra pp. A closing word must be said about the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment, which is never expressly relied on by the Court, but whose judicial precedents turn out to be linchpins of the confession rules announced today.
To support its requirement of a knowing and intelligent waiver, the Court cites Johnson v. All these cases imparting glosses to the Sixth Amendment concerned counsel at trial or on appeal. While the Court finds no pertinent difference between judicial proceedings and police interrogation, I believe. The only attempt in this Court to carry the right to counsel into the stationhouse occurred in Escobedo , the Court repeating several times that that stage was no less "critical" than trial itself.
See U. This is hardly persuasive when we consider that a grand jury inquiry, the filing of a certiorari petition, and certainly the purchase of narcotics by an undercover agent from a prospective defendant may all be equally "critical," yet provision of counsel and advice on that score have never been thought compelled by the Constitution in such cases.
The sound reason why this right is so freely extended for a criminal trial is the severe injustice risked by confronting an untrained defendant with a range of technical points of law, evidence, and tactics familiar to the prosecutor, but not to himself. This danger shrinks markedly in the police station, where, indeed, the lawyer, in fulfilling his professional responsibilities, of necessity may become an obstacle to truthfinding.
See infra , n. The Court's summary citation of the Sixth Amendment cases here seems to me best described as. Examined as an expression of public policy, the Court's new regime proves so dubious that there can be no due. The foregoing discussion has shown, I think, how mistaken is the Court in implying that the Constitution has struck the balance in favor of the approach the Court takes. Ante , p.
Rather, precedent reveals that the Fourteenth Amendment, in practice, has been construed to strike a different balance, that the Fifth Amendment gives the Court little solid support in this context, and that the Sixth Amendment should have no bearing at all.
Legal history has been stretched before to satisfy deep needs of society. In this instance, however, the Court has not and cannot make the powerful showing that its new rules are plainly desirable in the context of our society, something which is surely demanded before those rules are engrafted onto the Constitution and imposed on every State and county in the land.
Without at all subscribing to the generally black picture of police conduct painted by the Court, I think it must be frankly recognized at the outset that police questioning allowable under due process precedents may inherently entail some pressure on the suspect, and may seek advantage in his ignorance or weaknesses.
The atmosphere and questioning techniques, proper and fair though they be, can, in themselves, exert a tug on the suspect to confess, and, in this light,. A confession is wholly and incontestably voluntary only if a guilty person gives himself up to the law and becomes his own accuser. Ashcraft v. Until today, the role of the Constitution has been only to sift out undue pressure, not to assure spontaneous confessions. The Court's new rules aim to offset these minor pressures and disadvantages intrinsic to any kind of police interrogation.
The rules do not serve due process interests in preventing blatant coercion, since, as I noted earlier, they do nothing to contain the policeman who is prepared to lie from the start.
The rules work for reliability in confessions almost only in the Pickwickian sense that they can prevent some from being given at all. Ante , pp. What the Court largely ignores is that its rules impair, if they will not eventually serve wholly to frustrate, an instrument of law enforcement that has long and quite reasonably been thought worth the price paid for it. To warn the suspect that he may remain silent and remind him that his confession may be used in court are minor obstructions.
To require also an express waiver by the suspect and an end to questioning whenever he demurs. And to suggest or provide counsel for the suspect simply invites the end of the interrogation. See supra , n. How much harm this decision will inflict on law enforcement cannot fairly be predicted with accuracy. Evidence on the role of confessions is notoriously incomplete, see Developments, supra , n.
We do know that some crimes cannot be solved without confessions, that ample expert testimony attests to their importance in crime control, [ Footnote 14 ] and that the Court is taking a real risk with society's welfare in imposing its new regime on the country.
The social costs of crime are too great to call the new rules anything but a hazardous experimentation. While passing over the costs and risks of its experiment, the Court portrays the evils of normal police questioning in terms which I think are exaggerated.
Albeit stringently confined by the due process standards, interrogation is no doubt often inconvenient and unpleasant for the suspect.
However, it is no less so for a man to be arrested and jailed, to have his house searched, or to stand trial in court, yet all this may properly happen to the most innocent, given probable cause, a warrant, or an indictment.
Society has always paid a stiff price for law and order, and peaceful interrogation is not one of the dark moments of the law. This brief statement of the competing considerations seems to me ample proof that the Court's preference is highly debatable, at best, and therefore not to be read into. However, it may make the analysis more graphic to consider the actual facts of one of the four cases reversed by the Court.
Miranda v. Arizona serves best, being neither the hardest nor easiest of the four under the Court's standards. On March 3, , an year-old girl was kidnapped and forcibly raped near Phoenix, Arizona. Ten days later, on the morning of March 13, petitioner Miranda was arrested and taken to the police station.
At this time, Miranda was 23 years old, indigent, and educated to the extent of completing half the ninth grade. He had "an emotional illness" of the schizophrenic type, according to the doctor who eventually examined him; the doctor's report also stated that Miranda was "alert and oriented as to time, place, and person," intelligent within normal limits, competent to stand trial, and sane within the legal definition. At the police station, the victim picked Miranda out of a lineup, and two officers then took him into a separate room to interrogate him, starting about a.
Though at first denying his guilt, within a short time, Miranda gave a detailed oral confession, and then wrote out in his own hand and signed a brief statement admitting and describing the crime. All this was accomplished in two hours or less, without any force, threats or promises, and -- I will assume this, though the record is uncertain, ante and nn -- without any effective warnings at all.
Miranda's oral and written confessions are now held inadmissible under the Court's new rules. One is entitled to feel astonished that the Constitution can be read to produce this result.
These confessions were obtained. They assured a conviction for a brutal and unsettling crime, for which the police had and quite possibly could obtain little evidence other than the victim's identifications, evidence which is frequently unreliable.
There was, in sum, a legitimate purpose, no perceptible unfairness, and certainly little risk of injustice in the interrogation.
Yet the resulting confessions, and the responsible course of police practice they represent, are to be sacrificed to the Court's own finespun conception of fairness, which I seriously doubt is shared by many thinking citizens in this country. The tenor of judicial opinion also falls well short of supporting the Court's new approach.
Although Escobedo has widely been interpreted as an open invitation to lower courts to rewrite the law of confessions, a significant heavy majority of the state and federal decisions in point have sought quite narrow interpretations. It is also instructive to compare the attitude in this case of those responsible for law enforcement with the official views that existed when the Court undertook three major revisions of prosecutorial practice prior to this case, Johnson v.
In Johnson , which established that appointed counsel must be offered the indigent in federal criminal trials, the Federal Government all but conceded the basic issue, which had, in fact, been recently fixed as Department of Justice policy. See Beaney, Right to Counsel , In Mapp , which imposed the exclusionary rule on the States for Fourth Amendment violations, more than half of the States had themselves already adopted some such rule.
In Gideon , which extended Johnson v. Zerbst to the States, an amicus brief was filed by 22 States and Commonwealths urging that course; only two States besides that of the respondent came forward to protest.
By contrast, in this case, new restrictions on police. No State in the country has urged this Court to impose the newly announced rules, nor has any State chosen to go nearly so far on its own.
The Court, in closing its general discussion, invokes the practice in federal and foreign jurisdictions as lending weight to its new curbs on confessions for all the States.
A brief resume will suffice to show that none of these jurisdictions has struck so one-sided a balance as the Court does today. Heaviest reliance is placed on the FBI practice. Differing circumstances may make this comparison quite untrustworthy, [ Footnote 19 ] but, in any event, the FBI falls sensibly short of the Court's formalistic rules. For example, there is no indication that FBI agents must obtain an affirmative "waiver" before they pursue their questioning.
Nor is it clear that one invoking his right to silence may not be prevailed upon to change his mind. And the warning as to appointed counsel apparently indicates only that one will be assigned by the judge when the suspect appears before him; the thrust of the Court's rules is to induce the suspect to obtain appointed counsel before continuing the interview.
Apparently, American military practice, briefly mentioned by the Court, has these same limits, and is still less favorable to the suspect than the FBI warning, making no mention of appointed counsel. Developments, supra , n. The law of the foreign countries described by the Court also reflects a more moderate conception of the rights of. Concededly, the English experience is most relevant. In that country, a caution as to silence, but not counsel, has long been mandated by the "Judges' Rules," which also place other somewhat imprecise limits on police cross-examination of suspects.
However, in the court's discretion, confessions can be, and apparently quite frequently are, admitted in evidence despite disregard of the Judges' Rules, so long as they are found voluntary under the common law test.
Moreover, the check that exists on the use of pretrial statements is counterbalanced by the evident admissibility of fruits of an illegal confession and by the judge's often-used authority to comment adversely on the defendant's failure to testify.
In India and Ceylon, the general ban on police-adduced confessions cited by the Court is subject to a major exception: if evidence is uncovered by police questioning, it is fully admissible at trial along with the confession itself, so far as it relates to the evidence and is not blatantly coerced.
See Developments, supra , n. Ramasamy [] A. Scotland's limits on interrogation do measure up to the Court's; however, restrained comment at trial on the defendant's failure to take the stand is allowed the judge, and, in many other respects, Scotch law redresses the prosecutor's disadvantage in ways not permitted in this country.
Considering the liberties the Court has today taken with constitutional history and precedent, few will find this emphasis persuasive. In closing this necessarily truncated discussion of policy considerations attending the new confession rules, some reference must be made to their ironic untimeliness. There is now in progress in this country a massive reexamination of criminal law enforcement procedures on a scale never before witnessed.
It is no secret that concern has been expressed lest long-range and lasting reforms be frustrated by this Court's too rapid departure from existing constitutional standards. Despite the Court's disclaimer, the practical effect of the decision made today must inevitably be to handicap seriously sound efforts at reform, not least by removing options necessary to a just compromise of competing interests.
Of course, legislative reform is rarely speedy or unanimous, though this Court has been more patient in the past. All four of the cases involved here present express claims that confessions were inadmissible not because of coercion in the traditional due process sense, but solely because of lack of counsel or lack of warnings concerning counsel and silence.
For the reasons stated in this opinion, I would adhere to the due process test and reject the new requirements inaugurated by the Court. On this premise, my disposition of each of these cases can be stated briefly. In two of the three cases coming from state courts, Miranda v. Arizona No. New York No. I would affirm in these two cases. The other state case is California v. Stewart No. In that case, I would dismiss the writ of certiorari on the ground that no final judgment is before us, 28 U.
If the merits of the decision in Stewart be reached, then I believe it should be reversed, and the case remanded so the state supreme court may pass on the other claims available to respondent.
In the federal case, Westover v. United States No. None of these other claims appears to me tenable, nor in this context to warrant extended discussion. It is urged that the confession was also inadmissible because not voluntary, even measured by due process standards, and because federal-state cooperation brought the McNabb-Mallory rule into play under Anderson v.
However, the facts alleged fall well short of coercion, in my view, and I believe the involvement of federal agents in petitioner's arrest and detention by the State too slight to invoke Anderson. I agree with the Government that the admission of the evidence now protested by petitioner was, at most, harmless error, and two final contentions -- one involving weight of the evidence and another improper prosecutor comment -- seem to me without merit.
I would therefore affirm Westover's conviction. In conclusion: nothing in the letter or the spirit of the Constitution or in the precedents squares with the heavy-handed and one-sided action that is so precipitously. The foray which the Court makes today brings to mind the wise and farsighted words of Mr.
Justice Jackson in Douglas v. Jeannette , U. The proposition that the privilege against self-incrimination forbids in-custody interrogation without the warnings specified in the majority opinion and without a clear waiver of counsel has no significant support in the history of the privilege or in the language of the Fifth Amendment. As for the English authorities and the common law history, the privilege, firmly established in the second half of the seventeenth century, was never applied except to prohibit compelled judicial interrogations.
The rule excluding coerced confessions matured about years later,. And, so far as the cases reveal, the privilege, as such, seems to have been given effect only in judicial proceedings, including the preliminary examinations by authorized magistrates. Our own constitutional provision provides that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.
And there is very little in the surrounding circumstances of the adoption of the Fifth Amendment or in the provisions of the then existing state constitutions or in state practice which would give the constitutional provision any broader meaning. Such a construction, however, was considerably narrower than the privilege at common law, and, when eventually faced with the issues, the Court extended the constitutional privilege to the compulsory production of books and papers, to the ordinary witness before the grand jury, and to witnesses generally.
Both rules had solid support in common law history, if not in the history of our own constitutional provision. A few years later, the Fifth Amendment privilege was similarly extended to encompass the then well established rule against coerced confessions:. Although this view has found approval in other cases, Burdeau v. McDowell , U. Carignan ,. Whether evidence is so connected with evidence illegally obtained as to be "tainted," and hence to be suppressed from the jury's consideration, appears to be a matter of law, initially to be ruled upon by the trial court.
The progenitor of the "fruits" doctrine is Nardone v. Nardone was concerned with the problem as to whether information obtained through illicit wire tapping could be used in evidence. In the particular setting of that case, the Court held as a matter of law that the evidence could not be used. However, the Court used careful language to indicate that the rule of suppression did not include all evidence which would not have been obtained but for the evidence illicitly received:.
That the "fruits" doctrine is not a for-the-loss-of-a-nail-a-kingdom-was-lost rule is indicated in Wong Sun v. United States, supra. It seems probable that Wong Sun would not have "voluntarily" 83 S. It seems to this Court that there is a natural classification of "fruits" into at least three possible categories. The first would be the situation presented in Wong Sun that of a subsequent confession of the accused himself. The second might be tangibles of evidentiary value.
The third might be testimony of witnesses who have personal knowledge of the crime. We first turn our attention to the "identification" testimony of the prosecutrix, which, if there are such categories of "attenuation," would fall in the most attenuated class, though admittedly the special circumstances here place it at the least "attenuated" end of the spectrum within such a classification.
It is the defendant's contention that it was error to permit the prosecutrix to testify that she identified the defendant and that this error was not cured by the instruction to disregard this testimony. If the Supreme Court of the United States has carried this "fruits" doctrine into the area of suppressing testimony falling within this postulated third classification of the living witness, it has not been called to our attention.
That this doctrine may be moving rapidly in this direction, however, is indicated by two decisions of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia. In Smith and Bowden v. Among the words of rationale for this decision are these:. However, when the case of Smith v. The Court distinguished Smith and Bowden on the basis that, in the previous case, the eyewitness had first resisted the giving of evidence against the defendants and then had subsequently changed his mind in this regard F.
If this is a valid distinction, then our constitutional privileges hinge on small differences indeed. This Court refuses to follow the "but for" rule of Smith and prefers the holding of Smith and Bowden supra, as we understand it. We hold that the testimony of the prosecutrix here was, as a matter of law, sufficiently "attenuated" from the confession that she should not be foreclosed from testifying at the trial before the fact finder.
We believe, "as a matter of good sense," this prosecutrix should have been permitted to relate to the jury her testimony that she was able to identify the defendant as soon as she was in the same room with him. We hold that it was error for the trial judge to exclude the prosecutrix' identification from the jury's consideration.
See State v. Arroyo, 99 Ariz. Overton, 2 Ariz. As to the confession obtained by Mrs. Hoffman from the defendant, the trial judge, after listening to several days of testimony as to the circumstances giving rise to this statement, held it to be admissible. It is our view that, under the holding of Nardone, this was not an abuse of discretion on his part.
In so concluding, we have considered defendant's argument that, had it not been for the illegally obtained confession, the defendant would probably not have confessed his guilt to this woman. But we believe it to be conclusively established here that Mrs. Hoffman was in no way acting for the police when she visited the defendant with whom she was living and to whom she referred as "husband", on this occasion.
Under the defendant's own version, he had not been interrogated by the police for more than a total of approximately two hours and this had ceased the day before he talked to Mrs. In relating to her the sordid details of this offense, he must certainly have had some disjointed motive, perhaps locked in the deep recesses of his subconscious, aside from the fact that he had confessed to the police. His relationship with this woman was very personal to him and to her.
Official conduct had nothing whatsoever to do with the formation of that relationship. Certainly the nature of the illegality which gives rise to the "fruits" must be considered in determining whether the evidence obtained is "tainted.
Johnson v. State of New Jersey, U. Certainly such a "taint" should be more easily "attenuated" than conduct more clearly proscribed by our Constitution. We hold that there was a sufficient "break in the stream of events" between the confession to the police and the confession to Mrs.
Hoffman, to justify the court in admitting this testimony. See Beecher v. Alabama, U. State of Texas, U. United States, F.
Killough v. Spencer, 66 Cal. The defendant complains that, in the hearing before the court in the absence of the jury, he was required to answer the question of whether his confessions to the crimes here charged were truthful ones. He contends that the ruling upon the voluntariness question should be decided completely divorced from the question of whether or not the confession was truthful.
Reliance is taken upon the following statement from the Miranda decision:. We do not believe that the trial court violated this axiomatic principle. It is obvious from this transcript that the trial judge did not regard, as conclusive of the voluntariness question, the fact that the defendant admitted his confessions were true. It is difficult to see, in any event, how this could be regarded as reversible error. It is well established that the admission of incompetent evidence, in a case tried to the court, is harmless error.
Garcia, 97 Ariz. Nor, we do not consider that the allowance of this cross-examination was erroneous. This jurisdiction is dedicated to a broad leeway in cross-examination.
State v. Little, 87 Ariz. The task before the trial court required it, in part at least, to consider the defendant's mental processes. The elusive nature of the voluntariness issue has been commented upon by our highest Court:. It is difficult for this Court to imagine a mental process involving the voluntariness of a confession that would not be amalgamated to some extent with the accused's own concept of his guilt.
We cannot see that it is error for the court, in the absence of the jury, and after the defendant has elected to take the stand, to permit cross-examination of the defendant regarding his belief as to his guilt or innocence at the time of a purported confession, for whatever value this may have to the court in determining whether the defendant voluntarily gave that confession.
An Orange County mom has filed a police complaint after her daughter was left with a concussion from a sucker punch during a youth basketball game. The rapper also pledged to offer full refunds to everyone who attended the concert. After two and a half years with the 49ers and zero games played, Jalen Hurd has been released. The 49ers announced today that they have released Hurd, who had been on injured reserve.
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The Duchess of Sussex told reporters that she is "always proud" of her husband. Bob Myers believes the Warriors will benefit from situations like the one between Draymond and Jordan Poole on the bench Wednesday.
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